When Strategy Miscues
II. When Strategy Miscues
In the last entry (above), I ended by summarizing the number of troops who have served in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001 or 2003, respectively. While the nation knows the toll in blood and lost lives in Iraq, only recently has the public began to focus on Afghanistan and to ask – again – how many more?
Unfortunately, the answer is always the same: how many is as unknown as it is incalculable and as particular as it is random, both for those who fight and for those in leadership who contrive to start or to continue armed conflict.
For the people of Afghanistan as for the American public, much will depend on the new “matrix” strategy being introduced to beat back the insurgency’s recent gains. The matrix is envisioned as measuring 50 “indicators” of progress on reaching a set of mutual goals established by the central Afghani government and coalition forces.
The U.S. ground commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, is not expected to request a specific troop increase when he testifies before Congress in September. What will spur the administration to request Congress authorize higher war spending is the “matrix effect” – created when separate elements from different backgrounds combine their capabilities into a new entity whose power is greater than the sum of its parts. The deployment of another 100 U.S. trainers is expected to act as the catalyst that finally produces a battle-wise and tested Afghani army – more professional, more concerned with human and civil liberties, more committed to democracy, and less corrupt than the other ministries.
While this is commendable psychology, it may well be non-transferable. A person unfamiliar with the meaning of key American theoretic concepts – e.g., “equality of opportunity” – that Americans instictively believe comes with Mom's apple pie are too often left to stumble about with no insight or other support. The result is a communal psychology that features the safety of the fighters before the safety of the community as a whole. At this point the psychology on which the culture rests becomes subject to widespread disintegration, leaving no understanding as to how such concepts of "equality" become integrated personal and communal actions that sustain national objectives without the burden of rigid matrices.
In the last entry (above), I ended by summarizing the number of troops who have served in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001 or 2003, respectively. While the nation knows the toll in blood and lost lives in Iraq, only recently has the public began to focus on Afghanistan and to ask – again – how many more?
Unfortunately, the answer is always the same: how many is as unknown as it is incalculable and as particular as it is random, both for those who fight and for those in leadership who contrive to start or to continue armed conflict.
For the people of Afghanistan as for the American public, much will depend on the new “matrix” strategy being introduced to beat back the insurgency’s recent gains. The matrix is envisioned as measuring 50 “indicators” of progress on reaching a set of mutual goals established by the central Afghani government and coalition forces.
The U.S. ground commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, is not expected to request a specific troop increase when he testifies before Congress in September. What will spur the administration to request Congress authorize higher war spending is the “matrix effect” – created when separate elements from different backgrounds combine their capabilities into a new entity whose power is greater than the sum of its parts. The deployment of another 100 U.S. trainers is expected to act as the catalyst that finally produces a battle-wise and tested Afghani army – more professional, more concerned with human and civil liberties, more committed to democracy, and less corrupt than the other ministries.
While this is commendable psychology, it may well be non-transferable. A person unfamiliar with the meaning of key American theoretic concepts – e.g., “equality of opportunity” – that Americans instictively believe comes with Mom's apple pie are too often left to stumble about with no insight or other support. The result is a communal psychology that features the safety of the fighters before the safety of the community as a whole. At this point the psychology on which the culture rests becomes subject to widespread disintegration, leaving no understanding as to how such concepts of "equality" become integrated personal and communal actions that sustain national objectives without the burden of rigid matrices.
posted by Dan Smith at 6:43 PM
4 Comments:
The critical fundamental facts are that the U.S. invaded and occupies Iraq for control of its oil resources, and the U.S. invaded and occupies Afghanistan and, in effect, Pakistan because of a lust for pipelines. The so-called election was simply part of the imposed U.S. strategy to make it appear that Afghanistan is moving toward becoming a "democracy.
It (Afghanistan), like Iraq, is deep quicksand.
Joan: I would be extremely interested in seeing your critical fundamental facts. Could you share your sources of these facts? Alan
I am a Vietnam veteran. Iraq was a false political decision that has cost us nearly a Trillion dollars for NO appreciable change in security. Afghanistan could have been handled differently, but still would have had negative return on invested resources.
It has become a quagmire, just as Vietnam did.
Joan is right Alan .. just look at the dollars spent ... Secular Iraq had no truck for religious fundamental extremists like Al Qaeda.
get the troops out now
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